My research primarily addresses questions at the intersection of ethics and science. One overarching research project is to determine the extent of our moral knowledge and virtue, whether concerning ordinary interactions with others (e.g. lying, stealing) or disputed moral issues (e.g. abortion, euthanasia, genetic enhancement, racial and gender bias). Whether we know right from wrong and act virtuously depends greatly on our moral psychology. Based on an adequate understanding of the sources of our moral beliefs and actions, we can assess whether we’re justified in holding particular moral views and properly motivated to do what’s right. Against a rising pessimism, I argue that ordinary moral thought and action are ultimately rational enterprises that aren’t fundamentally flawed. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement, and I’m also interested in how we can make ourselves more virtuous. (My views are thus largely “rationalist” and “non-skeptical.”)


Regard for Reason
in the
Moral Mind

(Oxford University Press, 2018)


Note: Article titles link to penultimate drafts (or self-archived finals if open access); journal titles link to final version if available. Both links contain abstracts.

Book Chapters

Reference Works

Book Reviews & Commentaries

In Progress

(If not already provided, drafts may be available upon request.)

  • An experimental paper on intuitions about decision-theory puzzles (in progress)
  • Two papers about how moral exemplars motivate emulation (early stages)
  • A paper on correcting for implicit bias (very early stages)
    An edited volume on moral responsibility & mental illness (very early stages)