Papers / Publications

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Below are my published articles, reviews, and work in progress. Comments are always welcome (and much appreciated).

Note: Generally, article titles link to penultimate drafts; journal titles link to final if available.

Articles

“What in the World Is Weakness of Will?” forthcoming, Philosophical Studies.

Co-author: Richard Holton.

Abstract: At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one‘s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton (1999, 2009) claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele (forthcoming) argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele’s studies and report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a variety of factors.

Blog discussion: Flickers of Freedom (5-29-10)

“Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism” forthcoming, European Journal of Philosophy.

Abstract: Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person’s intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some of a person’s intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are ultimately other-regarding in some sense. Dan Batson and other social psychologists have argued that experiments provide support for a theory called the “empathy-altruism hypothesis” that entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the data that are still not ruled out. One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. I argue for two main theses in this paper: (1) we can improve on Sober and Wilson’s conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson’s purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable. A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson‘s claim that the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject psychological egoism.

“Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions” Review of Philosophy & Psychology (formerly European Review of Philosophy), Psychology and Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, Tania Lombrozo, & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), pp. 265-273.

Co-authors: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull, and Aaron Zimmerman

Abstract: In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. The cases we focus on are two that are crucial to Stanley’s project:  one in which the protagonist does not have practical interest in the truth of the proposition she claims to know (Low Stakes) and one in which the protagonist does have such practical interest (High Stakes).  We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these cases.  Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer (2006) seems to make, regarding the salience of an alternative, in his critique of Stanley. Our data indicate that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves people from attributing knowledge to denying it.  However, the raising of stakes (but not alternatives) does affect the level of confidence people have in their attributions of knowledge.  We argue that our data cast doubt on what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our common-sense judgments about such cases are.

Blog Discussion: Experimental Philosophy (9-26-08)

Data Supplement (PDF)

Reviews

In Progress

(If not already provided, drafts may be available upon request.)

“Humeanism, Internalism, and Moral Fetishism”

Abstract: Michael Smith famously objects to a certain version of motivational externalism by claiming that it, among other things, amounts to an unseemly “moral fetishism.” Virtuous people are allegedly characterized by the externalist as overly concerned with doing what they think is right. There has been significant debate about this argument and whether the externalist has a satisfactory reply. What I want to show here are two things. First, Smith’s fetishism argument is a poor one against externalists because it relies on saddling them with a view they needn’t hold: a kind of Humean theory of motivation (distinct from the Davidsonian view for which Smith provides this label), according to which beliefs alone cannot motivate without the help of an antecedent desire. Second, this shows that the fetishism argument, and an often overlooked related argument of Smith’s in this context, in fact provides a positive case for a kind of motivational rationalism according to which pure reason can be practical in its issue. So, contrary to the orthodox dialectic, Humeans rather than rationalists are stuck attributing to virtuous agents the fetishistic “motive of duty.”

“Willpower and the Humean Theory of Motivation”

Abstract: Richard Holton (2003; 2009) has recently argued for a radically anti-Humean account of motivation. His view is opposed both to Humean as well as what he calls “augmented Humean accounts,” which it seems many philosophers who consider their views anti-Humean hold. Pointing primarily to empirical work in developmental and social psychology in developing an account of strength of will, Holton levels arguments against both views. This paper critically evaluates those arguments, concluding that they aren’t successful because Holton ultimately overlooks certain tools at his opponent’s disposal for answering his objections. While I consider myself an anti-Humean (an augmented Humean on Holton’s taxonomy), I provide no positive argument for the view here.

“Egoism, Empathy, and Self-Other Merging”

Abstract: Some philosophers and psychologists have evaluated psychological egoism against recent experimental work in social psychology.  Dan Batson (1991; forthcoming), in particular, argues that empathy tends to induce genuinely altruistic motives in humans. However, some argue that there are egoistic explanations of the data that remain unscathed.  I focus here on some recent criticisms based on the idea of self-other merging or “oneness,” primarily leveled by Robert Cialdini and his collaborators.  These authors argue that the putatively altruistic subjects are acting on ultimately egoistic motives because empathic feelings for someone in distress tend to cause the helper to blur the distinction between oneself and the other.  Employing a conceptual framework for the debate I have previously developed, I argue that the self-other merging explanation fails to explain the empathy-helping relationship on conceptual grounds, regardless of the results Cialdini et al. (1997) report.

“Psychological Egoism” in preparation for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.