The Possibility of Acting from Duty

Summary

Is it possible for us to do what we ought simply because we recognize it as such? Kant famously thought that only such actions–those done “from duty”– have moral worth. He illustrates this with several examples, which examine doing the right thing (e.g. a shopkeeper charging an inexperienced customer the normal price for goods) from different motives. There has been substantial debate about whether such a standard for moral worth is simply too high. But the question of this dissertation is a more psychological one: Can we act from duty?

Consider the many brave rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. Why did they voluntarily engage in such altruistic acts, risking their own well-being in the process? Motivational Kantians, myself included, maintain that at least sometimes we can do such things ultimately because we recognize we ought to do so. This capacity requires at least two others: (1) the ability to act on ultimately altruistic motives (since duty sometimes requires altruism), and (2) the ability of our normative beliefs to produce new motivations in us without the assistance of antecedent ones (since recognition is a cognitive state). But these capacities are ruled out by the following two theses. Psychological egoism maintains that we are always ultimately motivated by what we perceive to be in our own self-interest. Motivational Humeanism claims that beliefs can only generate new desires that serve or further an antecedent desire.

By focusing on recent philosophical arguments and empirical work from psychology to neuroscience, I argue that these two rival views are implausible. While egoism is almost universally rejected by philosophers, the arguments against it are utterly lacking. I argue that a proper attack on it must appeal to psychological research on empathy-induced helping. Humeanism, however, is arguably the dominant view in philosophy. Yet I argue that, like egoism, there is virtually no reason to believe it. While I do not purport to have conclusively argued for the existence of the capacity to act from duty, I contend this defense against two main challengers renders it a live possibility.

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Chapter Breakdown

Ch. 1 – The “Motive” of Duty (52 pp. | 15,000 words)

Abstract: Develops a framework for discussing motivation generally with a brief characterization of the three theories of motivation: self-intersted (Hobbesian), passionate (Humean), and dutiful (Kantian).

Ch. 2 – Egoism: Conceptual Issues (36 pp. | 9,800 words)

Abstract: Develops a framework for discussing psychological egoism, improving on one from Sober and Wilson. Argues that egoism should be taken seriously since the tradtional philosophical arguments against it fail.

Ch. 3 - Egoism: Empirical Issues (49 pp. | 13,500 words)

Abstract: Argues against psychological egoism based on empirical work on empathy-induced helping. Defends Batson’s work against various challenges from theorists such as Sober & Wilson, Cialdini, and Nichols.

Ch. 4 – Humeanism: Conceptual Issues (55 pp. | 15,500 words)

Abstract: Develops a framework for discussing Humeanism, distinguishing it from internalism. Provides a presumptive case for rationalism over Humeanism based on ordinary attributions of beliefs in motivational explanations (with some ties to Smith’s “moral fetishism” argument). Defuses prominent and recent philosophical arguments for Humeanism (from Foot, Lenman, Blackburn, Mele, Sinhababu).

Ch. 5 – Humeanism: Empirical Issues (37 pp. | 10,000 words)

Abstract: Against primarily Roskies, Nichols, and Schroeder, shows rationalism is compatible with a range of empirical work on certain neurological disorders. Reveals that rationalism is also compatible with, and provides a plausible explanation of, empirical work on temptation. Concludes with an appendix evaluating Holton’s recent willpower approach.

Total word count: 63,800